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We compute both seigniorage rate and  welfare cost of inflation rate in Colombia using a  
Sidrauski-type model  in which preferences are separable functions of the service flows of  
non-durable goods and  money holdings.  The set of the estimated parameters imply 
sizeable welfare cost of inflation  and  seigniorage rates. However,  eventhough for low 
inflation rates seigniorage rate markedly increases with the rate of inflation,  for very high 
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Reduction of welfare cost of inflation  has been one of the  goals of monetary  policy in
Colombia .However, estimates assessing quantitatively the welfare losses associated with
different rates of inflation have shown quite different  results, which means that further research
in this sense would be useful.
  Among the first approximations to this measure for Colombia was the paper by
Carrasquilla-Galindo-Patrón (1994). Their estimates of welfare loss for an increase in inflation
rate from 5 per cent to  20 percent reach the sizable figure of  7  percent of the GDP. On the other
hand, the estimates made by  Posada (1995) and  Riascos (1997) for an inflation rate of  20
percent are around  3.9 percent and 1.5 percent of GDP, respectively.  The  paper by
Carrasquilla-Galindo-Patron has more information about the Colombian economy and a richer
econometric framework that the one used by Riascos(1997) and Posada (1995) (which is a
calibration exercise),  but the estimates of their model are quite large in comparison with
previous results for countries with inflation rates higher or lower than the Colombian, such as
Israel or the United States,   respectively.
Carrasquilla-Galindo-Patron used an approach similar to the one used by Eckstein and
Leiderman (1992), but did not take into account the service flow of  purchases of goods for more
than one period, even though the consumption variable used by them included consumption of
durable goods. Besides, the monetary aggregate used was M2, which would not be a good
aggregate to analyze the  effects of the inflation rate on welfare.
In this paper,  we try one approach closer to the one used by Eckstein and Leiderman
than the one used by Carrasquilla-Galindo-Patron. The first part of the paper deals with
estimation - on quarterly time series for Colombia- of the parameters of a model that treats
consumption and money demand behavior as jointly arising from a single optimizing framework
of a representative agent, as in the modern monetary theory (Sidrausky, 1967).
After obtaining estimates for the key parameters, the second and main part of our work
consist of comparing steady states of the model assuming different rates of inflation to determine
both, the  welfare loss associated with different steady states rates of inflation and the2
relationship between inflation rate and seigniorage revenue predicted by the model. We calculate
that  the steady state welfare cost of  a  moderate inflation of 10 percent  per year  at 1.37 percent
of GNP, quite similar to the one of  Israel, 1.4 per cent and more than twice as big as the
available estimates for the United States - given the same inflation rate. The welfare cost of an
inflation  rate around  20 percent per year  is about 2.4 per cent of GDP according to our
estimates, which are in between the estimates by Posada and Riascos.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In  section 2 we describe the model
and discusses some steady state implications of the model. In section 3  we describe the data and
econometric methodology used in estimation.  Section  4 presents the parameter estimates and
tests of  the over-identifying restrictions. In section 5,  we use parameter estimates and auxiliary
assumptions about hypothetical steady state are used to determine the model’s quantitative
implications for the relation between seigniorage and the rate of inflation and for the welfare cost
of inflation. Concluding remarks are presented in section 6.
2.  The Model
This  model treats consumption and money demand behavior  as jointly arising from a
single  optimizing framework of a representative agent, as in modern monetary theory (see e.g.
Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) for similar specifications)
Suppose that consumers rank alternative sequences of consumption of services from
goods using  the utility  functional:
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W F   is the consumption percapita of services from goods at date t, mt denotes real money
balances per capita,  β  ∈  (0,1) is a subjective discount factor, and  the period
utility function is of the  constant relative risk-averse form,3
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where  ϒ   and   θ    are preferences parameters,  with coefficient of relative risk aversion (1-θ ).
The parameter θ  must be less than unity in order to obtain a concave utility. The lower  θ   the
higher the  relative risk aversion coefficient and the lower the intertemporal  elasticity of
substitution.
The consumption of services from goods is not measured and, therefore, it is necessary to
specify a technology for transforming goods into services in order to proceed with the empirical
analysis. Following Telser and Graves (1972), all consumers are assumed to have access to linear
technologies that transform consumption goods purchased today into services flows in the future.
The service flow 
*
W F   is assumed to be given by
                     (3)   
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where ct denotes actual purchases of consumer goods,  δ 0 = 1 and in this paper m = 1
1. Thus
consumption purchases at time t directly affect consumption services in both t and t + 1.
Each household´s budget constraint, in per capita real units is given by
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where  bt, mt, and ct are, respectively, the real per capita values of one-period financial assets,
money balances, and consumption. NT and π t denote population growth and the rate of inflation,
respectively, and the real interest factor (1+rt-1) is equal to
(1+Rt-1)/(1+π t), where Rt-1 denotes the nominal return on assets. yt is real per capita income from
other sources.
Substituting the specification about the relation between consumption services and
purchases into (1) we have to solve the problem
                                                        
1 For non-durable goods, it is common in the literature to use m=1, however, for durable goods, see Dunn and
Singleton (1985) for an alternative specification that take into account a different technology for transforming goods
into services.4
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and from the budget constraint (4),
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Therefore, differentiating with respect to bt and mt  and dividing by  Uc*(t)  we obtain the   Euler
equations,
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Euler eq.(8)  relates the disutility  of giving up one unit of consumption at date t  to the
present value of the utility  from shifting that unit of consumption in the next period. Euler eq.(9)
relates the expected utility cost  of giving up one unit of consumption at date t  to  the expected
benefits  from allocating in money holdings the foregone consumption during  one period.  This
Euler equations can be used to construct orthogonality  conditions for use in estimation and
inference.
The marginal utilities with respect to mt and  
*
W F   implied by  (2) are given by
(10)    Um(t)   =  γ (mt)
γθ -1(ct + δ ct-1)
θ (1-γ )
(11)    U * F (t)  =   (1-γ )  (mt)
γθ   (ct + δ ct-1)
θ (1-γ ) -15
2.1.  Implications of the model for seigniorage and welfare cost of inflation
The implications of the model for seigniorage and welfare cost of inflation are derived by
comparing steady states of the model assuming different rates of  inflation.
It is assumed that  percapita consumption and real money balances grow in steady states at a
constant rate  Φ , that population grows at a constant rate n, and that all real variables do not change
with respect to steady state changes in the rate of inflation.
With this assumptions and rearranging Euler equation (9), we  obtain a  steady state
































where c and π   denotes the steady state values of consumption per capita and rate of inflation and,
   α 1   =  βδ (1+Φ )
θ -1
   α 2  =   (1+n)
-1 (1+α 1)β (1+Φ )
θ -1
Welfare cost of various steady state levels of inflation are calculated by substituting eq(12)
into (2) and compute the percentage decrease in consumption per capita that would generate the
same welfare loss as that from moving from π= 0 to π> 0. This welfare loss is expressed as a
percentage of GNP and given by,





























Where Ψ   is the ratio of consumption to GDP
2.
                                                        
2 ’’ Den Haan (1990) shows that a welfare measure based on an expression such as eq.(13) leads to very similar
answers as the measure that calculates the area  under the steady-state money demand function of the structural
model’’ (Eckstein and Leiderman, 1992).6
Seigniorage per capita is given by














where H is the monetary base and h denotes the monetary base in real per capita units. In steady
state equilibrium the gross rate of change of the monetary base ( Ht/Ht-1) is equal to
(1+n)(1+Φ )(1+π ). Substituting for ht the derived demand for real monetary base from eq.(12) and
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Where  Ψ  is the ratio of consumption to GDP and κ  is the inverse of the money supply
multiplier. As in the standard literature about seigniorage, there are two components of SR:  the
inflation-tax rate, that increases when inflation accelerates, and the tax base which is the demand for
real balances and it decreases when inflation accelerates.
If  [1-β (1+Φ )
θ ]> 0,  SR would be increasing with respect to π . This would be the case if β< 1, Φ  ≥  0,
and θ  ≤  0. In this case SR would not exhibit a Laffer curve that arises from a model based on a
Cagan-type money demand.
3.    The Econometric model and the data
Consider the first-order condition (8)  together with (9), from the agent´s intertemporal
optimum problem, let
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Accordingly, we interpret the ukt as the disturbances in our econometric analysis. Eq.(16)
and (17) are the two-equation system to be estimated whose parameter vector is
σ = (β ,δ ,γ ,θ ).
Hansen’s (1982) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) provides a convenient
framework for estimating nonlinear system of simultaneous equations. Suppose that the goal is to
estimate a system of n nonlinear equations of the form
yt = f(σ, xt) + ut
For  xt a (k x 1) vector of explanatory variables and σ a (p x 1) vector of unknown parameters.
Let zit denote a vector of instruments that are uncorrelated with the ith element of ut. The q
orthogonality conditions for this model are
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Hansen(1982ª) shows that the estimator of σ o  with the smallest asymptotic covariance
matrix given our choice of instruments is obtained by minimizing the criterion function
(16)    JT(σ) =  gT(σ)’ST
-1 gT(σ)8
where gT(σ) = T
-1Σ Ztut(σ), and ST
-1 is a consistent estimator of the population  weighting matrix
The weighting matrix is positive definite and, for this model, due to the presence of a two-period-
ahead forecast error in the Euler equations, the type of covariance matrix estimate that would be
more suitable would be the Heterocedasticity Autocorrelation Consistency Covariance Matrix.
Identification requires an order condition (q ≥  p) and that the columns of  (∂f(σ,wt)/∂σ’)
be linearly independent.
The expressions in (16) and (17) are scaled by  U * F (t)  =   [(1-γ )  (mt)
γθ   (ct + δ ct-1)
θ (1-γ ) –1]
in order that the disturbances will be strictly stationary processes in the presence of certain types of
real growth in  purchases of goods and money balances.
The sample period for the empirical analysis is 1977.2 thorough 1997.4. Quarterly data
on total private consumption were obtained from National Planning Department . We also used  a
measure for  real purchases of non-durable plus services  based on the classification made by
Alejandro López (1996). Money is defined as the standard M1. The nominal interest rate is the
quarterly lending rate charged by banks (the appendix presents estimates with the banks deposits
rate) . The inflation rate is measured by the percentage  change in the GDP price deflactor.
4.   Parameter estimates and test results
The results from estimating the model are displayed in table 1. We report two set of
estimates corresponding to two alternative definitions of consumption (total private consumption
and consumption of non-durable plus services).
In addition to the parameter estimates and estimates of their respective standard errors,
we report a statistic for testing the validity of the over-identifying restrictions implied by the
model, the JT statistics. The instrument vector, zt, associated with the disturbance u1t and u2t
included the constant unity, the first lagged  value of the growth rates of consumption and real
money balances per capita, the inflation rate and  the real interest factor. With these five
instruments and two equations there are ten orthogonality conditions, q=10.  Since there are four
parameters to be estimated, p=4, there are six overidentifying restrictions.9
The parameter estimates displayed in table 1 are qualitatively similar for the two
alternative definitions of consumption. The point estimates of the concavity parameter,
θ , are lower than zero, which  means a relatively high risk aversion coefficient and a low
intertemporal  elasticity of substitution. Estimates of  γ   and β  are between zero and one as
expected and large relative to their estimated standard errors. The estimates of the lag for
consumption of non-durable, δ , are economically plausible and similar to the estimates for Israel
(between 0.3-0.6) and the United States (0.6 according to Dunn and Singleton estimates)
The test statistic, JT(σ), is equal to 8.08  when total consumption is used and to 8.25  when the
proxy for non-durable and services variable is used. The null hypothesis is that the model is correctly
specified, and one compares the test statistic to a  χ
2
q-p. In this case, the critical
χ
2
6 is  12.6   at  5  percent significance level. So we do not reject the  null hypothesis and assume that
the model is correctly specified.
5.   Implications for seigniorage and welfare cost of inflation.
Based on the parameter estimates obtained in the previous section, and based on eq. (13) and
(15), we made some estimates from the seigniorage as a percentage of GDP and  from the welfare
cost of inflation for Colombia. Table 2 report the results for seigniorage as a percentage of GDP and
        Table  1 : Parameter estimates and t-values
                          C                             CN
Parameters
β           0.959         0.959
                      (235.67)   (245.5)
γ                       0.052     0.055
        (36.29)   (35.46)
θ          -1.310   -1.102
        (-3.04)   (-2.79)
δ                       0.717    0.697
                       (1.71)                           (2.66)
         J(σ)= 8.08     J(σ)= 8.2510
for the welfare cost of inflation for Colombia and also for Israel according  to the estimates obtained
by Eckstein and Leiderman (1992). The parameter values used are:
where the values for  Ψ , n, φ  correspond to the quarterly sample means of the share of consumption
in GDP, the rate of change of population, and the rate of change of consumption percapita,
respectively.
The results for Seigniorage rate, SR, in table 2 show that Seigniorage rate is an increasing
function of the rate of inflation. That is, government can raise more revenue by increasing monetary
base growth and inflation.  For low rate of inflation SR markedly increases with increases in π , but
then SR reaches an asymptote.  Besides SR is higher in Colombia than in Israel.  Finally, the result
suggest that an inflation rate of  20 percent per year  would result in a seigniorage rate of about 3.1
percent of GDP
3.
In order to compute the decrease in per capita consumption (expressed as percent of GNP)
that would generate the same welfare loss as that from increasing inflation from zero to a given rate,
we use eq. (13). Welfare cost of inflation depends on the degree of  risk aversion.           The higher
the degree of  risk aversion, the lower is the welfare cost of inflation. From table 2, we see that a
                                                        
3 Inflation rate average in the period 1977-1997 was about 23 percent and the observed seigniorage rate was 2.9
percent of GNP according to document of the department of Monetary and Reservs from the Central Bank of
Colombia (1995).
Table  2
Parameter   values
                    ￿Israel           Colombia
        β                      0.980             0.960
         γ                          0.050             0.060
   
         θ                         -1.500          -1.100
         δ                          0.300            0.600
         Ψ                         0.610            0.700
          n                        0.580            0.510
          φ                         0.008            0.005
    11
shift from zero inflation to an annual rate of inflation of 10 percent (i.e., 2.41 per quarter) results in a
loss in utility equivalent to about 1.3  percent of GDP  in Israel and Colombia.  This estimate is
much lower than the estimate for Colombia obtained by Carraquilla-Galindo-Patron (1994), where a
decrease of the inflation rate from 20 to 5 percent represents  decrease in the welfare cost of inflation
of about that was about 7 percent of GDP.   Moreover,  our estimates for  the welfare loss due  to an
increase in the inflation rate from 10% to 20% are equivalent to about  1.0 per cent of GDP, similar
to the estimate of  1.2 per cent  of GDP found by Posada (1995)
4.
Comparing the estimate of  welfare loss of around  1.3 percent of GDP when inflation
increases from zero to 10 percent in Colombia and  Israel,  to the estimates found for the United
States,  it is more than  twice as big as the welfare loss for the United States. For example, for the
same inflation rate the estimated welfare loss for the United States are 0.28% of GDP according to
McCallum (1989), 0.3% of GDP according to Fisher(1981), and 0.39 percent of GDP computed by
Cooley and Hansen(1989).
 Table 3:  Seignorage ratio and Welfare cost of inflation  for Israel  and  Colombia
                                 percentage of GDP
      π
(quarterly)
      SR
    Israel
        SR
    Colombia
        WL
      Israel
             WL
        Colombia
0,0 1,2 1,0 0,0 0,0
1,2 1,7 1,8 0,8 0,7
2,4 2,0 2,4 1,4 1,3
5,0 2,3 3,1 2,5 2,3
10,0 2,7 3,9 3,8 3,7
15,0 2,8 4,3 4,6 4,6
20,0 2,9 4,5 5,3 5,3
28,0 3,0 4,8 6,0 6,2
32,0 3,0 4,8 6,3 6,6
50,0 3,1 5,1 7,2 7,7
70,0 3,1 5,2 7,9 8,5
90,0 3,1 5,2 8,3 9,0
100,0 3,2 5,3 8,9 9,3
120,0 3,2 5,3 8,8 9,6
130,0 3,2 5,3 8,9 9,7
                                                        
4 The welfare cost calculations of  Posada (1995)  allow the possibility  of endogenous production and capital
acumulation. However, he based his estimation on parameter values estimated by Carrasquilla-Galindo and Patrón.12
6. Summary
In this paper we have presented estimates from the parameters of a model that treats
consumption and money demand behavior as jointly arising from a single  optimizing framework
of a representative agent, as in the modern monetary theory ( Sidrausky, 1967).
The  point estimates of the concavity  parameter,  θ  is lower than zero and has the
expected sign,  which means a relatively high risk aversion coefficient and low intertemporal
elasticity of substitution .  The discount factor estimated was around 0.96, the preference
parameter γ  is around 0.05 (much lower that the one estimated by Carrasquilla-Patron-Galindo
(1994). Finally, the parameter that captures the service flow of hte consumption goods, δ , is
around 0.7, a little higher than the estimates found in previous studies for the U.S.A. and Israel
which are around 0.6
The second part of this paper consisted of comparing steady states of the model
assuming different rates of   inflation  to determine both, the welfare loss associated with
different steady states of inflation and  the relationship between inflation rate and the
seigniorage revenue.  The results show that the welfare loss  due to an increase in the inflation
from 5% to 20% is no higher than 2.3% of the  GDP, again much lower estimates than the
estimates from Carraquilla-Patron – Galindo , around 7% of GDP.
On the other hand, our estimates for the welfare loss due to an increase in the inflation
rate from10% to 20% are equivalent to about 1% of the GDP, similar to the 1.2% of GDP found
by Posada (1995).
Finally, the results on seigniorage rates shows that seigniorage rate is an increasing
function  of inflation rate, but it reaches an asymptote. It does not have the shape of the Laffer
curve. Besides, seigniorage rate is higher in Colombia than in Israel;  an inflation rate of 20% per
year in Colombia would result in a seigniorage rate of about 3.1% of GDP.13
Appendix
Table   :  Estimates under alternative asset  return
Banks    Deposit   Rate
Parameter estimates and t-values
                                     CN
Parameters
        β                       0.959
                             (245.5)
         γ                          0.055
                     (35.46)
         θ                         -1.102
                    (-2.79)
        δ                           0.697
                                   (2.66)
     J(σ)= 8.2514
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